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TOWN OF ISLIP v. CA VIGLIA:
"SECONDARY EFFECTS"-
CENSORSHIP IN DISGUISE
Free speech has been recognized as the cornerstone of democ-
racy.1 The first amendment of the United States Constitution2
I See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). Justice Cardozo in reference to
freedom of speech wrote: "Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispen-
sable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." Id. See also Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (public discussion is a fundamental
principle of American government and "[the] freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that with-
out free speech [freedom] would be futile."). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DOM, 96 (1960) ("freedom to speak" and "political freedom" has been established by Con-
stitution "as the basis of any established arrangement by which men govern themselves,...
"); Raban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1283-
1344 (1983) (discussion of development of influential views of Zechariah Chafee, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, and Louis Brandeis).
Various views have been expressed on the value of free speech. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-6, at 835 (3d ed. 1986) (discussion of
Milton's theory that free speech is valued for its prevention of ignorant human error and
Mill's theory that free speech encourages public enlightenment); MEIKLEJOHN, supra, at 4-7
(free speech is vital to democratic government); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (free speech is valuable since it provides for marketplace
of ideas from which truth could be discerned). In his famous dissent in Abrams, Justice
Holmes elaborated on the marketplace of ideas theory for freedom of expression:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment.
Id. Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" approach to free speech has been criticized by several
commentators. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-1, at 786 (2d ed.
1988) ("This 'marketplace of ideas' argument for freedom of speech may at times serve
liberty well, but it relies too dangerously on metaphor for a theory that purports to be
more hard-headed than literary"); But see Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing
Myth, DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (1984) (market is biased in favor of positions supporting "an en-
trenched power structure or ideology").
' See U.S. CONST. amend. I. In pertinent part, the first amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law . ..abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . I. " Id.
There historically has been disagreement regarding the intent behind the adoption of
the first amendment. Compare CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19-21 (1941)
(arguing that framers intended to guarantee right of unrestricted discussion of public af-
fairs) with LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 309 (1960) (contending that framers meant to guarantee no more than freedom
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supports this fundamental tenet and provides necessary protection
against otherwise legitimate assertions of governmental power.'
Recognizing the unique protection provided by the first amend-
ment, judges and commentators have continually attempted to de-
fine the true values served by the first amendment as well as the
governmental interests that warrant its infringement." Because it
from prior restraints). See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 1, § 20.5, (dis-
cussion of Chafee's and Levy's views behind enactment of first amendment).
First amendment guarantees are applicable to the states under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment which prohibits a state from depriving "any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. See Pen-
nekamp v Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (first amendment principles applied to state
under fourteenth amendment due process clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) ("For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech .. . [is]
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 11-2, 772 (discussion of selective incorporation of Bill of Rights by four-
teenth amendment); Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and The Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L.
REV. 237, 301 (1982) ("The weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the four-
teenth amendment was designed to require the states to respect all the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights."); Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 267 (1986) (first amendment incorporated into due process clause of
fourteenth amendment).
I See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). In Schneider, Justice Roberts summa-
rized the essence of this country's traditional commitment to individual freedoms: "Al-
though a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of public safety, health, welfare
or convenience, these may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution
to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion." Id. See also
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 ("Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,
[the people] amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaran-
teed."); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (government "must exercise
its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action,"
particularly, limitations in Bill of Rights); Mayton, Seditious Libel and The Lost Guarantee of
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 117 (1984) (underlying objective of Bill of
Rights was to identify those personal liberties that were to be protected against otherwise
legitimate assertions of government power). But see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 865, 874-75 (1960) (primary purpose of first amendment was to withdraw from gov-
ernment power ability to restrict any type of speech). See generally Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV., 246 (discussion of Justice Black's absolu-
tist theory). However, the Court has failed to achieve a majority adherence to an absolutist
theory. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("First and Fourteenth
Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to
speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances
that he chooses."); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1960) ("It has never
been held that liberty of speech is absolute."); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395,
405 (1952) ("This Court has never so [held that first amendment principles are absolute]
and indeed has definitely indicated the contrary."). See generally W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTER-
PRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 24 (1984) (comprehensive analysis of various meth-
ods of judicial review and classification of speech).
' See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 (1971). "[T~he government has no power to restrict expres-
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is not an absolute right,5 some types of expression6 merit greater
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. The interests of
the state arise from the effects of the communication. See, e.g., Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (state has interest is protecting
"safety and convenience" of crowds); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110
(1972) (government may bar noisy demonstration on public streets abutting schools when
classes are in session); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) (state can impose
punishment for voluntary destruction of draft cards because of states vital interest in assur-
ing expedient mobilization of armed forces).
Additionally, the type of forum utilized also determines the state's interest. See Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (standards for
right of access to public property differ depending on character of property); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) ("The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain
exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create
the forum in the first place"); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974)
(degree of protection is determined by nature of forum and conflicting interests involved).
The Court has undertaken a balancing approach to define the parameters of the infring-
ing governmental interest. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51
(1961). Justice Harlan, writing for the majority wrote:
Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in
which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited
license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain con-
texts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection . . . . On
the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as
the type of law the First Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when
they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interest . . .(emphasis
added).
Id. at 49-51. Cf Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("[Ultterances
[that] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order or morality").
8 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-256 (1952) ("there are certain well de-
fined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any constitutional problem"); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-572
(1942) ("it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and
under all circumstances"); Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("the most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing panic"). See also LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER & SHIFFRIN, THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 414 (6th ed. 1986) ("Laws forbidding speech ...are commonplace").
" See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-7 (Court has found numerous types of expression to be
protected under umbrella of first amendment including pure speech as well as expressive
conduct). Cf. W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
186 (1976). Berns proffers that "expression" deserves less protection than "speech" be-
cause of the two, only "speech" is "connected to rationality and it is man's rationality that
makes him, unlike other animals, a being capable of governing himself." Id.
Various forms of expression have been deemed to warrant constitutional protection. See,
e.g., Sable Communications of California v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989) ("Sexual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected ..."); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.
Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989) (burning of American flag during demonstration is protected politi-
cal expression under first amendment); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
469 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (sleeping overnight in national park to protest plight of homeless
is "expressive conduct protected to 'some extent by first amendment"); Tinker v. Des
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constitutional protection than others.'
One area in which state regulations have been permitted to en-
croach first amendment rights is in the use of zoning authority to
exercise control over private property.8 Recently, municipalities
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-506 (1969) (wearing arm band
in protest of Vietnam conflict protected as "pure speech"). But see F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1977) (offensive language on radio permissibly regulated);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (burning draft card not necessarily
constitutionally protected conduct). See generally Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech
Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 29 (1973) (review of approaches toward
defining symbolic speech).
I See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 1, § 16-7 (general discussion of relative
levels of protection afforded various types of speeches). The Court has varied the level of
protection according to the category of speech. Id. While political speech is granted the
broadest protections against infringement, commercial speech is subjected to greater con-
stitutionally valid regulations. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713, 725
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial
restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences
may result.") with Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (Court determined that offensive writing on jacket
was political speech, and was entitled to highest level of protection) and Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561-66 (commercial speech is protected form of expression
if it passes four-part analysis).
Certain categories of speech have been found to be outside the scope of the first amend-
ment, and therefore not granted any protection from governmental infringement. See, e.g.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (libel and slander not always
entitled to constitutional protection), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (incitement likely to produce violence not constitution-
ally protected); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-85 (1963) (defamation of
public officials made with actual malice not protected by first amendment). See generally E.
ROME & W. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 5-6 (1985) ("certain cate-
gories of speech are wholly unprotected by the first amendment").
' See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 3.01 at 83-84 (3d ed. 1986) (discussion
of legal validity of municipal zoning powers). The state's police power, which encompasses
zoning authority, is granted by the tenth amendment, which provides: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are
reserved to the states respectively or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See, e.g., United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936) (all powers not expressly granted to United States by
Constitution, or reasonably implied from those expressly conferred, are reserved to states);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("Public safety, public health, morality, peace
and quiet, law and order" do not constitute entire scope of police power).
In turn, the individual states delegate their authority to local municipal governments. See
generally Note, Developments in the Law Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (1978); Cun-
ningham, Land-Use Control - The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L. REV. 367, 369 n.3
(1964) (enabling acts of 50 states); Note, State Land Use Regulation - A Survey of Recent Legis-
lative Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1972) ("Regulation of land use traditionally
has been a local function.").
Each municipality has the power to zone its land in the manner considered best to serve
the municipality's particular interests. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
37 -80 (1926). Zoning consists of the division of a municipality into districts, which are
then subject to use restrictions. See ANDERSON, supra, § 1.13 at 21. A zoning measure will
be held as constitutional so long as is substantially related "to the public health, safety,
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have been making wide use of zoning ordinances as an effective
means of controlling9 adult entertainment businesses.10 The con-
stitutional validity of this type of restrictive zoning was a question
of first impression for the New York State Court of Appeals in the
recently decided case of Town of Islip v. Caviglia." A sharply di-
vided court, in a 4-3 decision, upheld the zoning ordinance at is-
morals or general welfare." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. The Court elaborated on the compo-
nents of the rationality standard by stating that "before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, [it must be shown] that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable." Id.
Since Euclid, the Court has broadened its interpretation of the legitimate aims of zoning.
See Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (zoning ordinance prohibiting
more than two unrelated persons from living together served general welfare interest of
community); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (in land use regulations it is within
power of legislature to promote "values [which] are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary"). But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(normal deference given to legislative decisions concerning housing ordinances inappropri-
ate where law intrudes on family choice of living together).
' See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 53 (1982) (adult theatres limited
to approximately five percent of municipality); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance to decentralize location of adult en-
tertainment businesses); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298, 1303 (5th Cir.
1988) (upholding ordinance which prohibited sexually oriented business from locating
within 1000 feet of another by applying Renton), affd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part,
remanded in part, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990); see also Book-Cellar v. City of Phoenix, 150 Ariz.
42, 46, 721 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Ariz. App. 1986) (restrictive adult use zoning ordinance
upheld as state fair grounds deemed residential district); People v. Superior Court
(Lucerno), 49 Cal.3d 14, 21-22, 774 P.2d 769, 776-77, 259 Cal. Rptr. 740, 747-48 (1989)
(anti-skid row ordinance regulating regular and substantial course of conduct of adult en-
tertainment businesses); PA N.W. Distrib. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 555 A.2d 1368, 1371-72
(Pa. Commw. 1989) (restrictive zoning ordinance requiring adult businesses to be located
in commercial districts upheld); see generally, ANDERSON, supra at note 8, § 7.11 at 706-07.
"0 See PA N.W. 555 A.2d at 1369 n.1 (1989). This court has defined adult businesses to
include "any establishment offering for sale any book, publication, file or medium depict-
ing nudity or sexual conduct, or any movie theater which on a regular basis .. .showed
"X" rated films." Id. See infra note 15 (definition of adult business as defined by Town of
Islip).
Adult entertainment as used in this Comment refers to non-obscene adult movie theaters
and adult bookstores. The entertainment provided by adult movie theatres and adult book-
stores may be sexually pervasive or erotic but nonobscene under the obscenity standards as
established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1979). Obscene material is a category
of expression not deserving of first amendment protection. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[llmplicit in the history of the first amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance"); American Booksellers Assoc.,
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1986) (pornography distinguished from obscen-
ity, which has been categorized as outside first amendment). See also Note, Pornography,
Padlocks and Prior Restraints, The Constitutional Limits of the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1478, 1478 n.4 (1983) (list of statutes regulating obscenity by allowing for blanket
injunctions against obscene material).
- 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989).
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sue, maintaining that it was a regulation designed to carry out le-
gitimate and important governmental objectives, and had only an
incidental effect of abridging free expression.12
In Caviglia, the Town of Islip (Town) brought an action to per-
manently enjoin the operation of an adult bookstore located
within the downtown business district.1" Pursuant to a town revi-
talization study conducted in 1980,1 the Town adopted a zoning
ordinance that, in part, restricted all adult bookstores to operating
only in industrially zoned areas. 5 Caviglia continued to operate
12 Id. at 557-60, 540 N.E.2d at 222-23, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47.
"1 Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d 148, 153-54, 532 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786-787
(2d Dep't 1988).
14 Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 552-53, 540 N.E.2d at 218-19, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141-43. The
Town of Islip had commissioned a study to determine the effects of adult businesses on
neighboring areas. Id. 540 N.E.2d at 218-19, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141-43. This was part of a
downtown renewal project which involved over a seven million dollar investment. Id., 540
N.E.2d at 141-43, 532 N.Y.S. 2d at 786.
11 Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d at 153, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 786. The Islip Town Board unani-
mously approved the enactment of the adult use ordinance § 68-341.1. Id. Although this
was the first adopted ordinance, it was not the first attempted. See Appellant's Brief, Ex-
hibit A at 71-79, Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d
139. In 1975, the Town of Islip had initially proposed an ordinance restricting the locality
of adult entertainment establishments. Appellant's Brief at 72. After several months of
debate, the plan became a "political football" and was dropped. Id. at 74.
The adopted ordinance, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
Adult uses shall be allowable in an Industrial I District only as a special exception
by the Board of Appeals after public hearing.
A. Purposes and Considerations.
(1) In the execution of this ordinance it is recognized that there are some uses
which, due to their very nature, have serious objectionable characteristics. The ob-
jectionable characteristics of these uses are further heightened by their concentra-
tion in any one area, thereby having deleterious effects on adjacent areas. Special
regulation of these uses is necessary to ensure that these adverse effects will not
contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhoods or
land uses.
(2) It is further declared that the location of these uses in regard to areas where
our youth may regularly assemble and the general atmosphere encompassing their
operation is of great concern to the Town of Islip.
(3) These special regulations are itemized in this section to accomplish the primary
purposes of preventing a concentration of these uses in any one area and restricting
their accessibility to minors.
B. Definitions.
ADULT BOOKSTORE - an establishment having as a substantial or significant por-
tion of its stock-in-trade books, magazines, other periodicals, films, slides and video
tapes and which establishment is customarily not open to the public generally but
excludes any minor by reason of age.
ADULT THEATER - a theater that customarily presents motion pictures, films,
video tapes, or slide shows, that are not open to the public generally but exclude any
minor by reason of age.
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an adult bookstore within the downtown area, prompting the
Town to apply for an injunction under the ordinance to enjoin
the operation of the store." Caviglia opposed the injunction con-
tending that the ordinance was content-based, and as such, consti-
tuted a prior restraint on freedom of expression17 in violation of
his rights guaranteed by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution18 and Article I, section 8 of the New York State
C. The adult uses as defined ... are to be restricted as to location in the following
manner in addition to any other requirements of this Code.
(1) Any of the above uses shall not be located within a five-hundred-foot radius of
any area zoned for residential use.
(2) Any of the above uses shall not be located within a one- half-mile radius of
another such use.
(3) Any of the above uses shall not be located within a five-hundred-foot radius of
any school, church or other place of religious worship, park, playground or playing
field.
Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 562-63, 540 N.E.2d at 225-26, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50.
This ordinance is based on the Detroit Anti-Skid Row Ordinance, upheld by the Su-
preme Court in Young v. American Mini-Theatres 427 U.S. 50, 60-62 (1976). Caviglia, 141
App. Div. 2d at 150-51, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 784. Further, the decision to define adult use
bookstore as an establishment which excludes any minor by reason of age, was made in
order to avoid making the difficult determination as to what is pornographic and what is
not. Id. at 153-55, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87.
Several New York towns and villages have enacted restrictive zoning ordinances for
adult bookstores and theaters. See, e.g., Vestal, N.Y., Ordinance 009-82-T (1982) (requires
special permit for establishment of adult entertainment business); Angola, N.Y., Ordinance
006-80-V (1982) (authorizes and restricts adult uses to Type I, Industrial Districts); Owego,
N.Y., Ordinance 006-82-V (1982) (regulates establishment of adult entertainment
businesses).
" Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 564, 540 N.E.2d at 226, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 150. According to the
ordinance, termination of nonconforming adult uses was effected by an amortization provi-
sion. Id., 540 N.E.2d at 226, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 150. By using capital investments as a bench-
mark, the ordinance required termination over a period of 114 to 514 years. Id. at 560, 540
N.E.2d at 224, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 148. Caviglia was to have terminated operations by Janu-
ary 15, 1985. Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
Although raised as a constitutional issue from the outset, each of the courts had summa-
rily found amortization as a method of termination to be constitutional. See Caviglia, 141
App. Div. 2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 787 (rejected challenge to five year amortization
clause contained in ordinance); Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 560-61, 540 N.E.2d at 224, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 148 (amortization provisions will be sustained if period allowed to recapture
investment is reasonable).
In addition, appellant contended that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, however, this argument was dismissed by each court. Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d
at 163, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 197; Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 561-62, 540 N.E.2d at 224, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 148.
" Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
18 Id. at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 787. See Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 731
(1960) (state must follow federal constitutional due process guidelines which require that
nonobscene books are entitled to constitutional protection); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959) (publication and dissemination of books is a constitutionally protected
155
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Constitution."
The Supreme Court of Suffolk County granted an order to per-
manently enjoin the operation of the bookstore as an adult book-
store."0 Although the Appellate Division, on appeal, stayed the or-
der in part, it found that the zoning ordinance was a proper
exercise of the town's zoning power. 1 The court, utilizing tradi-
tional first amendment guidelines along with standards recently
formulated in Young v. American Mini Theatres" and City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres3 determined that the ordinance was content-
neutral and that it permissively infringed on free speech.24 Addi-
tionally, the court examined the ordinance under the broader
New York Constitutional guarantees and found that the underly-
ing rationale of the Young and Renton standards were in accord
with New York interests. 5
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' de-
cisions, noting that the ordinance met the Renton criteria, and
therefore was permissive under the United States Constitution. 6
freedom). See generally supra note 2 (text and discussion of first amendment of United
States Constitution).
1" Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
N.Y. CONST., art. I section 8 provides, in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the press."
N.Y. CONST. art. I section 8.
" Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
"1 Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d 148, 532 N.Y.S.2d 783. The Appellate
Division affirmed the lower court's findings with regard to the constitutionality of the zon-
ing ordinance. Id. However, it severed as superfluous, what they found to be an unconstitu-
tional provision requiring regulated businesses to obtain permits before relocation. Id. at
166-67, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95. Cf infra note 52, (discussion of third requirement of Ren-
ton test, which requires ample alternative channels of expression).
12 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
475 U.S. 41 (1986). See infra nn. 40, 52 (full discussion of Young and Renton
standards).
14 Caviglia, 141 App. Div. 2d at 160, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 790. The ordinance was labeled
content-neutral because it was aimed at the bookstore's effect on the surrounding commu-
nity, rather than at the contents of the bookstore. Id., 532 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
25 Id. at 160-61, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 790-91. See generally People ex rel Arcara v. Cloud
Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986) (examination of in-
fringement on bookseller's state constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression); Calde-
ron v. City of Buffalo, 61 App. Div. 2d 323, 326, 402 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (4th Dep't 1978)
(criminal prosecution imposes informal censorship on protected bookselling activity under
state constitution).
10 Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 552-55, 540 N.E.2d 215, 218-20, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142-44
(1989). The majority felt that the predominant purpose of the ordinance was a legitimate
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Furthermore, the court upheld the ordinance under the New
York State Constitution, finding that it incidentally infringed
upon freedom of expression, but that it was no broader than nec-
essary to achieve its purpose.
Writing for the dissent, Judge Titone strongly disagreed with
the majority's determination that, for purposes of state evaluation,
the ordinance was content-neutral.2" Viewing it to be content-
based,2 9 the dissent concluded that the Town lacked the requisite
compelling interest and therefore the ordinance was constitution-
ally flawed."0 Additionally, Judge Titone argued that even if the
zoning concern, enacted to eliminate the secondary effects of adult use bookstores, and not
to regulate expression. Id. Under Renton, the Supreme Court held this to be a permissive
infringement of expression. Id.
27 Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 555-56, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145. The determi-
nation of federal constitutionality does not end the inquiry, since the respondents are enti-
tled to protections afforded by the New York State Constitution. Id. See infra notes 53-54,
(discussion of protections afforded by New York Constitution). The court found that "[t]he
Town did not single out adult uses for regulation because of any hostility toward the views
expressed in the material ...but because they produced injurious effects on the Town's
neighborhoods." Caviglia 73 N.Y.2d at 557, 540 N.E.2d at 222, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 146. The
court found that the adopted ordinance was an appropriate method for addressing existing
problems since it was not over-broad and did not unduly restrict adult uses to unsuitable
areas. Id. Accordingly, the ordinance was no broader than necessary for its intended pur-
pose and therefore, did not violate the state Constitution. Id.
28 Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 569-70 n.3, 540 N.E.2d at 229-30 n.3, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 154
n.3. (Titone, J., dissenting). "Under our State Constitution, we should not countenance a
rule that permits otherwise content-based regulation to be recast as content-neutral simply
because the stated purpose is to control certain 'secondary effects' of that form of speech."
Id. at 574, 540 N.E.2d at 232, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Titone, J., dissenting). "[Any] regula-
tion whose application depends on content must be judged as a content-based regulation,
regardless of the underlying motive." Id. at 572, 540 N.E.2d at 231, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 155
(Titone, J., dissenting).
19 Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 566, 540 N.E.2d at 227, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 151. "[Slince Islip's
zoning ordinance is a content-based regulation that severely impinges on freedom of
speech, the presumption of constitutionality is overcome beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
"[The] ordinance is patently directed against establishments purveying a particular cate-
gory of material and has the effect of singling out a certain category of uses based solely
upon the content of the material contained on the premises." Id. at 567, 540 N.E.2d at
228, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
o See id. at 569, 540 N.E.2d at 229, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 153. "While there can be no doubt
that a municipality has an interest in the stability in revitalization of the neighborhoods,
this interest cannot be considered compelling without at least some showing that the form
of expression to be regulated has an actual and specific deleterious effect on the commu-
nity." Id. at 567, 540 N.E.2d at 228, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (emphasis in original). "Without
proof of actual secondary effects directly attributable . . .there exists nothing but [the]
Town's fear of the bookstore." Id. at 569, 540 N.E.2d at 229, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 153 (em-
phasis in original). The Town can not create a compelling interest by merely predicting
that without removal of the adult bookstores, the neighborhoods would continute to dete-
riorate. Id. at 568-69 n.2, 540 N.E.2d at 229 n.2, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 153 n.2 (citations
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ordinance could be cast as content-neutral, it would still violate
the New York State Constitution on the basis that it was not the
least restrictive means available."
It is submitted that by finding an apparently content-based zon-
ing ordinance to be content-neutral under state standards, the
New York Court of Appeals has implicitly adopted the federal
"secondary effects" analysis as set forth in Renton. It is further
suggested that by utilizing this standard New York has abdicated
the traditional expansive reading of its own Constitution. This
Comment will examine the federal and state standards for review-
ing governmental regulations that infringe on protected expres-
sion. It will then review the Caviglia decision, taking into account
recent developments in content-distinction jurisprudence.
I. ZONING AND TRADITIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: THE
FEDERAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
Traditionally, in the context of freedom of expression, govern-
mental restrictions that limit communication without regard to
the message conveyed by the speaker (content-neutral) have in-
voked a less stringent standard of review than restrictions that are
imposed precisely due to the message conveyed (content-based). 2
omitted).
11 Id. at 575-76, 540 N.E.2d at 233-34, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58. The town has the bur-
den "to prove that it has chosen the least restrictive means to accomplish its purpose....
[including] proof that other, less intrusive means had been tried and failed." Id., 540
N.E.2d at 223-34, 542 N.Y.2d at 157-58. "Islip simply failed to do so." Id., 540 N.E.2d at
233-34, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58.
" See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CM. L. REV. 20,
26-43 (1975). Karst believes that the principle of freedom of expression carries beyond the
purely political realm and embodies the whole culture of society. Id. Thus, freedom of
expression is meant to include freedom of religion, literature, art, science, and all other
areas of human knowledge and expression. Id. at 20 n.4 (referring to T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 7 (1970)).
The Court analyzes restrictions in terms of their impact on expression. See generally
Karst, supra, at 26-43. (general discussion of evolution of usage of two-level system ofjudi-
cial scrutiny); Nimmer, supra note 6, at 39-42 (1973) (discussion of status of symbolic
speech and appropriate levels of judicial scrutiny); Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 119 (1981) (analysis of dichotomy in degree of
judicial review given to content-based and content-neutral regulations of expression); Ste-
phen, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L REV. 203 passim (1982)
(examination of Court's distinguishing speech according to its content as a means of com-
mencing first amendment analysis); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46
passim (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions] (analysis of Court's content-
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Content-based regulations's presumptively violate the first
amendment." They are strictly scrutinized and may be upheld
only if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest.3 5 For content-neutral regulations, the United States Su-
neutral doctrine).
The Supreme Court has recognized that first amendment speech may not constitution-
ally be regulated on the basis of its content. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980)
(impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing); Police
Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (government regulations affecting speech cannot
be based on content of materials protected under first amendment). But see Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 837-40 (1976) (content-based statute upheld when aimed at keeping military
activities free from political entanglement); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (Court upheld content-based restriction which prohibited "fighting words").
33 See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32, at 47-48. "Content-based restric-
tions limit communication because of the message it conveys", while "[c]ontent-neutral lim-
its expression without regard to the content or communicative impact conveyed." Id. The
most obvious and most common form of content-based restriction consists of government
action - legislative, executive or judicial - that on its face expressly accords differential
treatment to the expression of certain specified messages, ideas, or information. Id. Famil-
iar examples are laws banning obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17.
(1973), and laws prohibiting the advocacy of violent overthrow of government, see, e.g.,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495 (1951); see also Stephan III, The First Amend-
ment and Content Discrimination, 68 U. CHi. L. REV. 203, 205 (1982) (discussing examples of
content-based restrictions Supreme Court has upheld).
"' See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 462-63 & n.7 (1980) (content based ordinance which im-
permissibly distinguished between labor picketing and all other peaceful picketing was vio-
lative of first amendment). In practice, very few content-based restrictions of speech sur-
vive strict scrutiny. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32, at 48. Professor Stone
has noted that "outside the realm of low-value speech, the Court has invalidated almost
every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past thirty years." Id. See, e.g.,
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (Court
invalidated restriction based on content of communication); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 26 (1971) (conviction based solely on content of communication held impermissible).
The Court, however, may weigh additional factors to uphold an otherwise impermissible
content-based regulation. See Pacific Gas and Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 14
(1986) (order denying access to public space to reply to controversial billing inserts was
constitutional; forced dissemination of hostile views would reduce flow of information);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (state's interest in protecting
captive audience compelling; upheld political advertising prohibition on buses).
" See Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62 (1980). "When government regulation discriminates
among speech related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause [of the four-
teenth amendment] mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state
interests, and the justifications offered for any distinction it draws must be carefully scruti-
nized." Id. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-79 (1983) (Court found
sidewalks to be traditional public forum, therefore prohibition which infringed on first
amendment rights was subject to strict scrutiny); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("In places by which long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly, and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive
activity are sharply circumscribed."); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968) (important governmental interest furthered by regulation which is no broader than
necessary will be found constitutional). See also Note, Municipal Zoning Restrictions on Adult
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preme Court has created two alternative tests.3 6 The first test re-
quires time, place and manner of speech restrictions be justified
by a significant governmental interest and, in addition, it requires
that ample alternative channels of communication be left open."7
Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny and Indianapolis' Special Exception Ordinance, 58 IND. L.J.
505, 512-13 (1983) (discussion of unconstitutionality of adult use zoning ordinance when
speech regulations are enacted based on governmental viewpoint).
"6 See Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19
ARIz. ST. L.J. 195, 200 (1987) [hereinafter Day, Hybridization]. Professor Day explains:
[T]he Court has employed two judicially created standards, the TPM [time, place
and manner] test and the incidental regulation test .... The policy consideration
reflected in the TPM test is the need to evaluate whether regulations that are sup-
posedly limited to only the "physical form" of protected speech are actually directed
at the content of the speech. In contrast, the primary policy consideration underly-
ing the incidental regulation test is the concern for the over-reaching effect of the
governmental restrictions that have an adverse impact on protected expression even
though the regulations were only intended to regulate noncommunicative conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
Professor Day concluded that while the two tests may involve overlapping concerns, the
distinction is "that the TPM regulation [is] a deliberate effort by the government to re-
strict expression." Id. Thus, "while a TPM regulation is established for the purpose of
abridging protected expression, an incidental regulation is a non-purposeful abridgement."
Id. at 200-01. See supra notes 33 and 34.
" See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981). The Court noted, "[W]e have often approved [time, place and manner] restrictions
• . . provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id. (quoting Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535, 544 (1980) (Court refused to uphold ban on billing inserts as
reasonable time, place and manner regulation).
The Court developed the time, place and manner analysis in the late 1930's and early
1940's. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (issuance of park permits based
solely on police chief's discretion described as lacking alternative channels and unconstitu-
tional); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (Court upheld municipality's
ability to regulate time, place and manner of parades without infringing first amendment
rights); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (Court struck down total ban on distrib-
uted materials, finding it prohibited "distribution of literature of any kind, at any time, at
any place and in any manner").
The seeds for the modern day time, place, and manner test were planted in Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). In Kovacs, the court used a version of the time, place, and
manner test as a basis for upholding a city ordinance that prohibited "loud and raucous"
noises. Id.
The doctrine was largely undeveloped after the Kovacs decision, and it wasn't until Hef-
fron that the Court provided a full explanation of the time, place, and manner doctrine.
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 661-63 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (ordinance
must be narrowly drawn as well as sufficiently justified by affirmative showing on part of
government). See generally, Note, Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expressive Activities
in the Public Forum, 61 NEB. L. REV. 167, 173-75 (1982) (general discussion of development
of time, place and manner doctrine as set forth in Heffron). Several other cases were instru-
mental in the evolution of the time, place, and manner doctrine. See Clark v. Community
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The second test requires that regulations indirectly affecting
speech must be enacted under constitutionally legitimate author-
ity, be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, further a
substantial state interest, and be "no greater than essential" to
achieve the desired state interest.38 The two approaches are not
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984) (Court applied time, place and
manner test to restriction of symbolic expression in national park and held ordinance
valid); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-77 (1981) (total ban on live nude dancing
failed time, place, and manner test).
38 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (seminal case in which Court outlines four part test for deter-
mining constitutionality of incidental regulation). O'Brien is the "fundamental decision in
the history of the incidental regulation doctrine ...." Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free
Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 491, 503 (1988) [hereinafter Day, Incidental Regulation].
In O'Brien, the defendant burned his draft card on the steps of a public building in Bos-
ton to protest the Vietnam War. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. The Court upheld the defend-
ant's conviction under a 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act which prohibited
"willful and knowing destruction" of a draft card. Id. at 370-71. But while the Act was not
an intentional attempt to restrict permissive expression, the O'Brien Court recognized that
it affected such expression disfavorably. Id. at 376-77. The Court gave this "conduct regu-
lation" a rigorous examination and announced what became known later as the "incidental
regulation test." Id. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). "[An inci-
dental burden on speech [which] is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible
... so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Id. See also Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cu-
ban Books and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communication, 26 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 779, 782-84 (1985) (discussion of distinction between purposeful restrictions and inci-
dental restrictions).
The "incidental regulation" test is applicable to "facially neutral" laws which, in their
effect, abridge protected speech. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 687-88. The use of the term
"facially neutral" in justice O'Connor's Albertini opinion proves confusing because the
opinion seemingly uses the term interchangeably with "content-neutral." Id. Mere facial
neutrality, however, does not constitute content-neutral. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969) (Court found ban on wearing of
armbands which was specifically adopted to prohibit particular symbol of expression not
content-neutral, even though facially neutral).
The central concern of the incidental regulation test has traditionally been to determine
if the governmental purposes underlying the challenged regulation are "unrelated" to the
suppression of protected expression. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Consolidated Edison Co., 447
U.S. at 540 n.9 (utilization of O'Brien test). See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study In The
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1496-97 (1975) (discussion of nature and extent of government interest in regulations re-
lated to suppression of expression); Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1231-32
(1984) (analysis must include whether government is acting as censor either openly or
through discretionary licensing standards).
More generally, when the Court finds an incidental regulation test, the government en-
joys a presumption that its action was not adopted to restrain speech purposefully. See
Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public
Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 175, 177 (1983) (regulations which protect non-speech regula-
tory interests are presumed constitutional); Schauer, supra, at 785-87 (discussing different
levels of judicial scrutiny which are applied to incidental regulation). Under these circum-
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entirely distinct. In fact, Supreme Court decisions have treated
the two standards as interchangeable. 9
In the mid-1970's the zoning of adult businesses became a seri-
ous matter for municipal legislative contemplation.40 In 1976, the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Young41 upheld a Detroit
stances, the government's burden of persuasion seems to be less than in the case of the
time-place-manner test. See generally Goldberger, supra, at 2 13 (as long as restriction is not
intentional censorship it is unlikely to be overturned; presumption that censorship has not
occurred).
" See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 687-690 (regulations incidentally affecting speech are valid so
long as they promote "a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation"); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at
293 (time, place, manner restrictions are valid if they "are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, leave open alternative channels for communication,
[and] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest"); Young, 427 U.S.
at 79-80 (Powell. J., concurring) (Court interchanges tests for time, place, and manner re-
strictions with those indirectly affecting free speech, saying the "essential weighing and
balancing of competing interests are the same"); Day, Hybridization, supra note 36, at 215
(suggesting Supreme Court has not only used tests interchangeably, but created hybrid test
for content-neutral regulations of free speech).
A number of lower courts have also conflated the two standards. See, e.g., Playtime Thea-
tres v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 536-38 (9th Cir. 1984) (city zoning ordinance regulat-
ing location of adult theaters was required to serve substantial government interest and to
be unrelated to suppression of free speech), rev'd, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Keego Harbor Co. v.
City of Keego, 657 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77) (not-
ing that "a variety of terms have been used to describe the governmental interest that must
be shown in order to justify incidental limitation on first amendment activities").
40 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976). Traditionally, local zoning
ordinances have been subject to constitutional limitations despite the states' broad author-
ity to regulate under their police power. See Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,
121 (1928) ("Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restrictions
that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private property .... ); Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (ordinances "found clearly not to conform to
the Constitution, of course, must fall"); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73-75 (1917)
(Court invalidated ordinance prohibiting black person from acquiring real property in
white residential area). In Young, the Supreme Court, for the first time, granted municipali-
ties a limited power to regulate the contents of expression through local zoning ordinances.
Young, 427 U.S. at 63.
Other jurisdictions, following the Supreme Court's lead in Young, have upheld similar
zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Hart Book Stores v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir.
1979) (statute which prohibited second adult establishment in single building upheld);
15192 Thirteen Mile Road, Inc. v. The City of Warren, 626 F. Supp. 803, 824-26 (E.D.
Mich. 1985) (ordinance restricting location of adult uses appropriately limited); U.S. Part-
ners Financial Corp. v. Kansas City, 707 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (disburse-
ment zoning ordinance upheld); 815 Foxon Road, Inc. v. Town of East Haven, 605 F.
Supp. 1511, 1517 (D.C. Conn. 1985) (ordinance restricting operation of adult movie
booths upheld). But see Amico v. New Castle County, 571 F. Supp. 160, 172 (D.C. Del.
1983) (ordinance prohibiting adult entertainment center within five hundred feet of resi-
dential property held unconstitutional because not narrowly drawn to protect legitimate
interests).
427 U.S. 50 (1976). See generally Note, The Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence of Jus-
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Anti-Skid Row ordinance' 2 against claims of interference with first
amendment rights of adult movie theater operators." Although
these regulations were seemingly content-based because they sin-
gled out adult movie theatres, the Court found them to be permis-
sive time, place and manner regulations."
In Young, the Supreme Court pointed out that the secondary
effects created by adult entertainment businesses are the focus of
the regulations rather than the content of affected businesses."5 In
tice Stevens, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 163-70 (1978) (analyzing and discussing Justice Stevens'
opinion in Young).
41 427 U.S. at 52-54 & nn.3, and 4; Detroit, Mich. Ordinance 743-G (Nov. 2, 1972),
discussed, 427 U.S. at 52-54 & nn.3-7. Specifically, the ordinance provided that an adult
theater may not be located within one thousand feet of any two other regulated uses. Id. at
52. The "regulated uses" include, in addition to adult bookstores, adult theaters and mini-
theaters, "cabarets [bars]; hotels, or motels; pawnshops; billiard and pool halls; public lodg-
ing houses; second hand stores; shoeshine parlors; and taxi dance halls." Id at 52 n.3.
A "skid-row" is "a section of a city frequented by hobos, vagrants, derelicts, etc." WEBa-
STER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1334 (2d ed. 1986). It has also
been defined as "an area of cheap barrooms and rundown hotels, frequented by alcoholics
and vagrants." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1791 (2d ed.
1987).
13 Young, 427 U.S. at 73-74 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell wrote, "I view the
case as presenting an example of innovative land-use regulation, implicating First Amend-
ment concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent." Id. at 79.
Respondents contended that the ordinance was "invalid under the first amendment as [a]
prior restraint on protected communication." Id. at 58. In addition, since the ordinance
affects "communications protected by the First Amendment, respondents argue they may
raise [a due process] vagueness issue even through there is no uncertainty about the impact
• . . on their own rights." Id. at 59.
44 Young, 427 U.S. at 63. "In short, apart from the fact that the ordinances treat adult
theaters differently from other theaters and the fact that the classification was predicated
on the content of the material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the place
where such films may be exhibited does not offend the First Amendment." Id.
46 Young, 427 U.S. at 71 & n.34. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion asserted that the ordi-
nance was directed at neighborhood deterioration, increased crime, and similar adverse
"secondary effects" which the city had found to result from a concentration of adult estab-
lishments, and not at restricting speech merely because the city thought it offensive. Id. See
also Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The Court noted:
At first glance, the Renton ordinance, .. . does not appear to fit neatly into either the
"content-based" or "content-neutral" category. To be sure .... the ordinance treats
theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters. Never-
theless . . . the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at
'adult motion picture theaters', but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters
on the surrounding community.
Id. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3, at 798 n. 17 (discussing ramifications of secondary effects
test on definition of content neutrality); Note, The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 100, 192-93 (1986) (distinction between Young and Renton treatment of content
neutral ordinances).
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Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance 4 that restricted the
location of adult motion picture houses.47 While the ordinance ap-
peared to be content-based, 8 the Court found the regulation to
46 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Renton decision was the
latest in a line of cases in which the Court attempted to balance a municipality's interest in
a regulation against the extent which the regulation restricts a first amendment right. See
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981) (total ban on live nude danc-
ing throughout borough violative of first and fourteenth amendments); Metromedia v. City
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1980) (striking down ordinance imposing substantial
restrictions on erection of outdoor advertising displays within city); Shuttlesworth v. Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (Court held unconstitutional ordinance conferring
upon city commission broad power to prohibit parades, processions or demonstrations).
Prior to Renton, the leading case in this area was Young v. American Mini Theatres. See supra
notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussion of the Young decision). The Renton majority
viewed Young as controlling. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.
The "balancing" the Court attempts to achieve is one of reasonableness. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 12-19, at 950-51 (noting that the Renton Court had to strike reasonable
balance between community interests and individual rights); Kalvin, The Concept of the Pub-
lic Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 27, 28 (Court attempts to achieve reasona-
ble balance between protected expression and governmental interest in regulation). In bal-
ancing, a court must consider "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time," and must "weigh heavily
the fact that communication is involved." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972).
Upon examination, the Court seldom speaks of balancing, but says that the state interest
justifying a place or manner regulation must be "substantial" or "compelling." See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (regulation must be narrowly tailored to
further that interest); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17 ("regulation must be narrowily tailored
to further the State's legitimate interest."); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)
("public [interests] in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the
police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by
the Constitution."). Commentators have noted that this requirement of a "least restrictive
alternative" or "narrow tailoring" amounts to a balancing test. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 38,
at 1485-87 & n.16.
"" Renton, 475 U.S. at 43. The Renton Court rejected a first amendment challenge to a
zoning ordinance prohibiting "adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1000
feet of any residential zone, single or multiple - family dwelling, church, park, or school."
Id. Cf Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (Court upheld ordi-
nance providing that adult theaters may not be located within 1000 feet of two other regu-
lated uses); Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 568, 540 N.E.2d 215, 228, 542
N.Y.S.2d 139, 153 (1989) (court upheld ordinance restricting adult uses to Industrial I
districts and not within 500 feet of residential uses).
"Moreover, Renton marks the first time that the Court has upheld the constitutionality of
an ordinance which is content-based on its face, which seeks to restrict constitutionally
protected expression, and which effectively imposes a total ban on the restricted expres-
sion." See Note, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.: Court Approved Censorship
Through Zoning, 7 PACE L. REV. 251, 252 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Court Approved
Censorship].
" See supra notes 32-34, and accompanying text (discussion of content-based restric-
tions). The ordinance in question in Renton restricted the exhibition of motion pictures
characterized "by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sex-
ual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' " Renton, 475 U.S. at 44. On its face, this ordi-
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be content-neutral because it was aimed at the negative secondary
effects of such theaters on the community, and not at the speech
itself.4 ' The ordinance easily survived the more deferential stan-
nance easily fits within the general definition of content-based restrictions. See Renton, 475
U.S. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Renton's zoning ordinance selectively imposes limita-
tions on the location of a movie theater based exclusively on the content of the films shown
there."); Note, supra note 47 at 251, 276 ("Renton's adult theater zoning ordinance is
properly viewed as a content-based restriction on constitutionally protected speech, and,
therefore, requires review under a standard of strict judicial scrutiny."); L. TRIBE, supra
note 1, § 12-19, at 952 (outward appearance of restriction was that it was content-based);
supra notes 32, 33 (discussion of content-based regulations).
Despite its outward appearance as a content-based restriction, the majority held that
"the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of content-neutral
speech regulations .... " Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3 at 798
n.17 (despite outward appearance, it was not content-based, "because the government
chose to defend the rule with reasons other than its impact on the minds of listeners.")
(emphasis omitted); Stone, supra note 32, at 115 (Court treated restriction as content-neu-
tral because it was defended on grounds of theaters' secondary effects on community).
11 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48. Some of the alleged 'secondary effects' offered by Renton
were as follows:
[Finding number 2 states that [Ilocation of adult entertainment land uses on the
main commercial thoroughfares of the City gives an impression of legitimacy to, and
causes a loss of sensitivity to the adverse effect of pornography upon children, estab-
lished family relations, respect for the marital relationship and for the sanctity of
marriage relations of others, and the concept of non-aggressive, consensual sexual
relations.
[F]inding number 12 states that [I]ocation of adult entertainment land uses in close
proximity to residential uses, churches, parks and other public facilities and schools,
may lead to increased levels of criminal activities, including prostitution, rape, incest
and assaults in the vicinity of such adult entertainment land uses.
Id at 59-60 nn. 3, 4 (citations omitted).
See supra note 45 infra note 51-52 (general discussion of secondary effects).
Another noteworthy outcome of the Renton decision is that the Court expressly approved
the use of another city's study to establish a substantial governmental interest. Renton, at
50-51. The Court endorsed the rationale of Northend Cinema v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.
2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1978), to entitle Renton to rely on the
experiences of nearby Seattle and other cities in enacting its adult theater zoning ordi-
nance. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-51. Justice Rehnquist, authoring the majority opinion,
clearly noted:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other
cities, and in particular on the 'detailed findings' summarized in the Washington
Supreme Court's, Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting its adult theater zoning ordi-
nance. [See Northend Cinema, 90 Wash. 2d at 711, 713, 719, 585 P.2d at 1155, 1156,
1159] The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordi-
nance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already gen-
erated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem the city addresses.
Id. at 51-52.
Cf. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 553, 540 N.E.2d at 219, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 143 ("[T]own's ordi-
nance was predicated on its own study as well as the studies of ordinances prepared by
other municipalities.").
The Court concluded that new studies or independent evidence were unnecessary since
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dard of review reserved for content-neutral time, place and man-
ner restrictions on speech. 50 The Supreme Court thus created a
"secondary effects" test " which provides that a seemingly con-
tent-based ordinance will be upheld when it is justified by a desire
to eliminate a "secondary harm" - a harm entirely unrelated to
the communicative impact of the speech at issue.5"
the evidence Renton relied upon was reasonably relevant to its specific problem. Renton,
475 U.S. at 51-52.
1* Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. ("In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with
our definition of content-neutral speech regulations as those that 'are justified without ref-
erence to the content of the regulated speech.' " (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981))). See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1979) ("a constitutionally permissible time. place, or manner
restriction may not be based on either the content or subject matter of speech").
The O'Brien incidental effects test for content-neutral speech was the determinative anal-
ysis in the first adult use zoning ordinance upheld by the Supreme Court. See Young, 427
U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 231-32 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]
(Young court tested subject matter restrictions by "flexible standards of content-neutral
balancing").
" Renton, 475, U.S. at 48-49. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3, at 798-99 n.17
(discussing potential dangers of broad reading of secondary effects test); Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32, at 115-17 (Court transformed content-based restriction
into content-neutral because it was aimed at "the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community"); Note, supra note 45, at 195-97 (1986) (secondary effects test
betrays superficiality of Court's inquiry into content-neutrality); Note, The Role of Secondary
Effect in First Amendment Analysis; Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 161,
179 (1987) (discussing problems of secondary effects test as it grants deference to govern-
mental interests).
Other commentators have mentioned the possibility of broader applicability of Renton's
reasoning. See, e.g., Day, Incidental Regulations, supra note 38, at 495 & n. 17 (1988) (stating
Renton appears to merge tests for content-based and content-neutral regulations into single
hybrid test); Farber & Frickey, A Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 913-14
(1987) (arguing that Court has adopted inconsistent approach toward hybrid regulations on
speech); Note, Motivation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 344, 346-47 (1987)
(Renton replaced old "two-track" system with inquiry into motive for regulation).
52 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3 at 798 n.17
(regulations "aimed not at the content per se ... but rather at the secondary effects" are
treated as content-neutral under Renton); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32
at 115 (Court in some cases, has treated content-based restrictions as if they are content-
neutral); Note, Motivation Analysis, supra note 51, at 347-48 (Court's finding of content-
neutrality is "contingent on a finding of permissible government motivation").
The Renton Court established the secondary effects test for determining when a facially
content-based zoning ordinance aimed at controlling adult uses (bookstores, theaters, peep
shows, etc.), can be constitutionally upheld as content-neutral. City of Renton v. Playtimes
Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-54. First, the municipality must establish that the "predomi-
nant concerns" of the ordinance is the control of secondary effects and is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." Id. at 47-48. Second, the ordinance must "further a sub-
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II. THE NEW YORK STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although state courts may not diminish individual rights guar-
anteed by the federal Constitution, 5 they may interpret their own
constitutions and laws to supplement or expand upon federally
guaranteed rights."' New York has traditionally tolerated expres-
stantial government interest." Id. at 52. Third, it must be " 'narrowly tailored' to affect
only that category [of uses] . . .shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects." Id.
Fourth, it must allow "for reasonable alternative avenues of communication" Id. at 53.
11 See Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 556, 540 N.E.2d 215, 221, 543 N.Y.S.2d
139, 145 (1989) (although state courts are bound by Supreme Court decisions defining
federal constitutional rights, those rulings only establish a minimum standard); Linde, First
Things First: Rediscovering the States Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383 (1980) ("Noth-
ing in the state's laws or constitution can diminish a federal right."); Note, Developments in
the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1326, 1334 (1982)
("Federal law sets a minimum floor or rights below which state courts cannot slip").
As early as 1873, this concept of a federal minimum standard was recognized by the
Supreme Court acknowledging that the fourteenth amendment provides national security
against violation by the States of the fundamental rights of the citizens. Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873). Furthermore, freedom of speech has been deemed
a fundamental right. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech
among personal fundamental rights protected by fourteenth amendment from impairment
by states). See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (discussion of incorporation of Bill of
Rights).
" See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 317, 94 N.E. 431, 448 (1911). The New
York Court of Appeals concluded in 1911 that Supreme Court interpretations are simply
not "controlling of our construction of our own constitution." Id. See, e.g., State v. Henry,
302 Or. 510, 515-16, 732 P.2d 9, 18 (1987) (statute making dissemination of obscene ma-
terial crime is unconstitutional, as obscene expression does not fall within any historical
exception to plain meaning of Oregon constitution); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 905, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979) (state
constitutional provision extending greater free speech rights than federal constitution),
affd, 477 U.S. 74 (1980).
There have been alternative theories advanced to justify the usage of a state constitu-
tional provision to guarantee greater protection of individual freedoms. See generally Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490-91
(1977).
Following the Warren Court, the Burger Court began a trend of curtailing individual
rights which has continued under the leadership of Justice Rehnquist. See Duncan, Termi-
nating the Guardianship: A New Role for State Courts, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 809, 816-17 (1988).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, selected by President Reagan, has emulated Reagan's conservative
ideals, and in fact the Court under Rehnquist's leadership has been constricting the scope
of federally protected individual freedoms. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (erosion of right to abortion by allowing greater state regula-
tion); Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989) (upheld extension of RICO
statute to obscenity violations); Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986)
(upheld school sanction of student who gave speech colored by sexual innuendo); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Georgia sodomy statute held not violative of funda-
mental rights of homosexuals). See generally Duncan, supra at 821-33 (state courts have
responded to federal constriction of individual rights by extending greater protection
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sions that would not have been deemed protected under federal
guidelines or those of other states.55 This has primarily been
achieved by interpreting the New York Constitution to afford a
broader scope of protection than that accorded by the federal
Constitution.56
New York defines the scope of permissive governmental in-
fringement upon individual rights in the same manner as the Su-
preme Court: a regulation is initially classified as either content-
based or content-neutral.5 Therefore, New York goes further by
recognizing that restrictions of first amendment rights may be
present not only where a statute directly prohibits expression, but
also where the "impact" of the statute curtails the exercise of
these rights.58 Thus, New York has recognized as crucial the im-
through state constitutions).
Alternatively, a particular states own history or unique tradition may encourage expan-
sion of individuals rights granted under the federal constitution. See Titone, State Constitu-
tional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in the Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 431,
465-66 (1986).
s' See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494,
510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986). "When federal guarantees have fallen short of what is
deemed to be adequate protection of the rights of our citizens, our Court of Appeals has
not hesitated ... to provide greater rights." Id. See also Bellanca v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 230, 429 N.E.2d 765-66, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87, 91 (1981) (blanket pro-
scription of topless dancing, although valid under federal constitution, deemed violative of
guaranteed freedom of expression under New York State Constitution), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1006 (1982); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 166, 379 N.E.2d. 1169,
1171, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 48 (1978) (provisions of enforcement of mechanics lien violated
due process under state constitution protection, without corresponding protection from
federal Constitution).
See People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d
907, 911 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8, provides, in
pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech." Id. Thus, New York affirmatively proclaims the right of
free speech. Id.
" See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (general discussion of distinctions be-
tween content-based and content-neutral regulations).
" See, e.g., Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 558-59, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (clos-
ing of adult bookstore for nuisance violation held invalid because impacted protected activ-
ity of bookselling); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 106 App. Div. 2d 189, 202-03,
484 N.Y.S.2d 849, 857 (2d Dep't 1985) (denial of access to shopping mall to distribute
leaflets found to infringe on freedom of speech rights), rev'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d
496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1985).
An area which warrants special examination is prior restraints. Generally, any suppres-
sion of speech prior to publication or dissemination is unlawful unless justified by a clear
and present danger. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("Any attempt to
restrict ... liberties must be justified by clear public interest threatened by clear and pre-
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pact of the regulation on the protected activity and has not fo-
cused upon the nature of the activity itself to determine whether a
regulation has unconstitutionally infringed upon an individual's
freedom of expression." The test has been aptly articulated as
"look not at who [the ordinance] is aimed ... but at who is hit. "60
Using the federal standards as a guideline, New York courts
have upheld content-based regulation only when there is a com-
pelling governmental interest in the restriction of an activity, and
when that activity is within the state's constitutional power to con-
trol.6" In contrast, when examining a content-neutral regulation
New York courts have balanced the competing interests at stake
in order to determine the constitutionality of the infringement,
yet the courts remained mindful of the broad protection afforded
to state citizens. 62
In the examination of competing interests, the New York courts
have developed criteria that identify permissible infringements of
expression.'" These criteria are substantially similar to the federal
sent danger"). Unconstitutional prior restraints may arise where the impact of the statute
curtails the exercise of first amendment rights. See East Meadow Community Concerts
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 134, 219 N.E.2d 172, 175, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 345
(1966) (established state law that government may not impose prior restraint on freedom
of expression absent showing that such expression will immediately and irreparably create
public injury); Madole v. Barnes, 20 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 229 N.E.2d 20, 26, 282 N.Y.S.2d
225, 229 (1967) (denial of use of community courthouse by political organization found to
be unwarranted prior restraint).
" Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 575, 540 N.E.2d at 233, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157; Arcara, 68
N.Y.2d at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
" Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 575, 540 N.E.2d 215, 224, 542 N.Y.S.2d
139, 157 (1989); People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 558, 503 N.E.2d
492, 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (1986).
" See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (comprehensive discussion of constitu-
tional requirements to uphold content-based regulations).
" See Lucas v. Scully, 71 N.Y.2d 399, 406, 521 N.E.2d 1070, 1072, 526 N.Y.S.2d 927,
930 (1988) ("a State constitutional challenge ... requires a balancing of the competing
interests at stake: the importance of the right asserted and the extent of the infringement
are weighed against the institutional needs and objectives being promoted"). See also Peo-
ple v. Kovner, 98 Misc. 2d 414, 418, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352 (1978).
When the application of governmental restrictions designed to regulate a social evil
creates an indirect tension with the provisions of the First Amendment, the govern-
ment has the burden of establishing that its interests are legitimate and compelling
and that the incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights, if any, is no
greater than essential to vindicate subordinating interests.
Id.
3 See Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 607, 409 N.E.2d
818, 822, 431 N.Y.S.2d 340, 344 (1980). "A proper analysis calls for examination of the
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standards" and special emphasis has traditionally been placed on
the scope of the infringement.6 5 The New York Court of Appeals
has placed an affirmative duty on the state to show that less re-
strictive remedial measures would fail to eliminate the unwar-
ranted effects.66
III. Caviglia: THE ADOPTION OF THE SECONDARY EFFECTS TEST
The Caviglia decision casts a portentous shadow on Justice Mar-
shall's emphatic assertion that "[a]bove all else the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent."67 The decision can be viewed as endorsing a "disturbing,
incoherent, and unsettling precedent,"" which "leads to a reduc-
tion of first amendment protection."69 The gravamen of the
degree of interference with the First Amendment interests, the strength of the governmen-
tal interest justifying the restriction and the means chosen to prevent the asserted evil." Id.
See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 65 N.Y.2d 326, 335, 480 N.E.2d 1089,
1098, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307, 316 (1985) (test set forth in Nicholson closely resembles the
O'Brien test). Compare Nicholson, 50 N.Y.2d at 607, 409 N.E.2d at 822, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 344
(1980) with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
" See Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 559, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
However, there seems to be some disagreement among the courts as to the standard to
be used when judging governmental infringement. Compare People v. Hollaman, 68 N.Y.2d
202, 207, 500 N.E.2d 297, 311, 507 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (1986) ("restriction must be no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest"); People v. Durham, 98 Misc.
2d 927, 930, 415 N.Y.S.2d 183, 186 (1979) (curtailment must leave open ample alternate
channels); Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 50 N.Y.2d 524, 531 n.7, 429 N.E.2d
765, 769 n.7, 429 N.Y.S.2d 616, 620 n.7 (1980) (court suggested sliding scale, requiring
that more compelling interests be shown when more traditional forms of expression are
jeopardized). However, most courts agree that the test must be higher than that of mere
rational relationship. Bellanca, 54 N.Y.2d 228, 237 n.8, 429 N.E.2d 765, 779 n.8, 445
N.Y.S.2d 87, 91 n.8 (1981).
See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 559, 503 N.E.2d 492, 499,
510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850 (1986) (Where government failed to show any remedial efforts
court concluded "no undue burden is placed on the State by requiring it to prove that...
it has chosen a course no broader than necessary to accomplish its purpose.").
" Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). justice Marshall delivered
the unanimous opinion of the Court which held a city ordinance unconstitutional when it
made an impermissible content-based distinction between peaceful union picketing and
other peaceful picketing. Id.
" Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32 at 115 (referring to Renton's reliance
on "secondary effects" test which New York Court of Appeals implicitly adopted in Cavig-
lia). See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
69 Note, supra note 50, at 344. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 798 n.17. "The Court
has recently added an ill advised dimension [the secondary effects test] to the determina-
tion of whether a restriction is based on 'content.' " Id. "Carried to its logical conclusion,
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Caviglia controversy boils down to the New York Court of Ap-
peals' implicit adoption of the Renton standard. 0
In reviewing the zoning ordinance against state constitutional
standards, the Caviglia court declared that the ordinance was not
a "purposeful attempt to regulate speech," and therefore deemed
it content-neutral. 1 This approach clearly fails to regard who is
"hit" by the ordinance. 2 It looks beyond the purpose of the ordi-
nance to its secondary effects; thereby adopting a Renton
analysis. 1
The New York Court's reliance on Renton is troubling for sev-
eral reasons, particularly since Renton has been questioned by both
the judiciary and the academic community. 74 The Renton ordi-
the doctrine gravely eroded first amendment protections." Id. However, Professor Tribe
noted that "Itihe Renton view will likely prove to be an aberration limited to the context of
sexually explicit materials." Id. at 799 n.17.
70 See Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 565, 540 N.E.2d at 226, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 148 (Titone, J.,
dissenting) ("the standard outlined in Renton v. Playtime Theatres severely undermines this
State's strict protection against content-based regulations, and indicates an abandonment of
the highly protective view of speech taken in Arcara. ... ) (citation omitted).
71 See id. at 553, 540 N.E.2d at 219, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (1989); supra notes 32-35, 36-
39 (general discussion of content-neutral and content-based distinction).
" See Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 575, 540 N.E.2d at 233, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157 (Titone,J.,
dissenting) "In this state [New York], the purpose of an ordinance is constitutionally irrele-
vant for it is only the impact that matters." Id., 540 N.E.2d at 233, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
See also Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (crucial factor
in determining infringement of free expression is impact of action on protected activity).
See generally supra notes 63-65 (discussion of state standards of review for permissive
infringements).
" See Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 570, 540 N.E.2d at 230, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 154 (Titone, J.,
dissenting). "[ln the absence of some other clearly articulated principle, the majority opin-
ion must be read as an incorporation of the predominant purpose (secondary effects test)
into the framework of [New York's] freedom of speech jurisprudence." Id., 540 N.E.2d at
230, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 154. However, an alternative is suggested by the dissent that despite
the stated rationale, the Town's actual motive is suspect. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 573, 540
N.E.2d at 232, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 156. Indeed, the majority makes reference to the large
investment in revitalizing the downtown area. Id., 540 N.E.2d at 232, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
"Moreover, the zoning changes have enabled new businesses to invest in the area with
assurances that no new adult uses will be permitted and that the existing uses will, in time,
be terminated." Id. at 557 n.6, 540 N.E.2d at 222 n.6, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 146 n.6.
71 See Boos v. Barry, 485 US. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgement in which Marshall, J., joined) ("The dangers and difficulties posed by
the Renton analysis are extensive."); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 55
(1986) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("Renton's zoning ordinance selectively imposes
limitation on the location of a movie theater based exclusively on the content of the films
shown there."); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court will not
rely solely on Renton as basis for decision), affid in part, rev'd in part, 485 U.S. 312 (1988);
City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242, 248 (Or. 1988) ("The obvious problem [with
Renton] is that when a locational restriction is justified by only the secondary effects of
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nance appeared on its face to be content-based; 5 it identified
speech of a certain content and, on the theory that such speech
caused undesirable secondary effects, restricted its exercise.7 6
Under the Court's prior holdings, it is precisely this sort of ordi-
nance that had demanded strict scrutiny.7 In Renton, the Court
departed from that precedent to hold that ordinances which regu-
late according to the content of speech should be deemed content-
neutral when they aim at remedying the negative secondary ef-
fects of the expression.7
showing or selling constitutionally protected materials, the restriction is unconstitutional if
the feared effects do not exist."). See also Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493
(6th Cir. 1987) (adult bookstore owner allowed to challenge insufficiently justified adult
business ordinance), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988); Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339,
1348 (7th Cir. 1986) (ordinance prohibiting residential picketing did not provide sufficient
alternative channels to anti-abortion picketers), vacated, 818 F.2d 1284 (1987).
See generally Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32, at 115-117 (voiced disa-
greement with Renton decision); Note, Constitutional Law - Zoning and the First Amendment -
Ordinance Prohibiting Operation of an Adult Theatre in a Residential Community Does Not Violate
the First Amendment - City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 17 SETON HALL L. REV.
925, 941 (1987) (two reasons to strike down Renton ordinance); Note, Court Approved Cen-
sorship, supra note 47, at 253 (1986) (rejects rationale behind Renton decision).
" See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (Court's discussion in Renton).
Previous decisions of the Supreme Court have looked to whether the content is being
regulated and if so, treated the regulation as content-based. See, e.g., Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noted validity of time, place, manner
regulations not aimed at content of speech); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (restriction of speech cannot be based upon con-
tent or subject of speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762-63 (1976) (struck down regulation of commercial speech as
being content-based).
" See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (analysis of Renton ordinance).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the City of Renton had "not shown that it was not motivated by a desire to suppress
speech based on its content." Playtime Theatres, v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 537 (9th
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit also found that Renton's justification for
the ordinance were "coficlusory and speculative" and that the stated reasons for the ordi-
nance "were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject matter." Id.
" See Renton, 475 U.S. at 141. The Renton City Council, relying on the experiences of
Seattle and other cities, adopted resolution No-2368, which prohibited the licensing of
"any business ... which . . . has as its primary purpose the selling, renting, or showing of
sexually explicit materials." Id. The resolution also contained a clause stating to the effect
that these businesses "would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and resi-
dences." Id. (citations omitted).
7S See Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508-509 (1981) (ordinance based
on contents of billboards invalidated after strict scrutiny of city's interest); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (restrictive ordinance prohibiting certain pick-
eting based on message conveyed found invalid after careful inquiry of city's interest). But
see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (zoning ordinance for
sexually oriented businesses upheld).
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As a result of the Caviglia decision, New York has failed to up-
hold its "long history and tradition of fostering freedom of ex-
pression . . . ." By adopting the Renton approach, New York has
altered its focus from the communication affected by the ordi-
nance to the undesirable secondary effects created by that expres-
sion. 80 Furthermore, by permitting the use of generalized studies
to substantiate alleged secondary effects, the court shifted the bur-
den of persuasion from the government to the individual."1 Addi-
tionally, the Court of Appeals determined that the ordinance was
no broader than necessary.82 However, this departure from the
former state standard eliminated the government's affirmative ob-
ligation to show that the regulation is necessary to achieve its pur-
pose. 83 It is argued that the Caviglia court has created a new stan-
dard, designed only to mimic the minimum guarantees of free
expression afforded to adult entertainment businesses by the fed-
eral Constitution.
It is submitted that the New York Court of Appeals should con-
tinue to broadly interpret the protection of free expression. Tex-
tual differences between the federal and New York State Constitu-
tions suggest that an expanded notion of freedom was intended
under the New York Constitution. 4 Although similar, the lan-
" Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145. See supra notes
55-56 and accompanying text (discussion of New York's historical view of constitutional
rights).
"0 See Caviglia, 72 N.Y.2d at 557-58, 540 N.E.2d at 222, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (noted
reasoning behind ordinance focused on secondary effects). See supra notes 51-52 (discussion
of focus of secondary effects).
"i See Caviglia, 72 N.Y.2d at 575-76, 540 N.E.2d at 232-33, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58
(Titone, J., dissenting). The Caviglia court did not require a showing that remedial mea-
sures would be ineffective. Id., 540 N.E.2d at 232-33, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58. See also
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 559, 503 N.E.2d 492, 495, 510
N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (1986) (not undue burden to require government to affirmatively show
remedial measures would be ineffective).
82 Caviglia, at 559, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
Compare Caviglia, 72 N.Y.2d at 559, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (ordi-
nance valid without actual showing that remedial measures would fail) with Arcara, 68
N.Y.2d at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847 ("no undue burden is placed on
the State by requiring it to prove ... [it] has chosen a course no broader than necessary to
accomplish its purpose").
', Compare U.S. CONST. amend I (federal constitution states, in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.") with N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (New
York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and pub-
lish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; no law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."). See Arcara, 68
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guage in each document has been interpreted to clearly represent
two distinct standards.8 5 While the language of the federal Consti-
tution protects expression from arbitrary government intrusion,
the New York Constitution affirmatively declares that "[e]very cit-
izen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects.""7 The Court of Appeals has traditionally granted broader
protection, based on these differences.8 8 Moreover, even without
textual differences in support of an expanded theory New York
has consistently upheld individual freedoms.8 9 Alternatively, New
N.Y.2d at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846 ("The function of the comparable
provisions of the State constitution, if they are not to be considered purely redundant, is to
supplement those rights to meet the needs of the particular State."); SHAD Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall, 106 App. Div. 2d 189, 200, 484 N.Y.S.2d 849, 857 (2d Dep't 1985)
(state and federal constitutional provisions do not operate as mirror images when language
is distinct); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173-
74, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1978) (fourteenth amendment includes the word "State," which
is absent from correlating New York State provision, allowing court more flexible require-
ment than mandated by federal counterpart).
" See Quinn v. Johnson, 51 App. Div. 2d 391, 393, 381 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (1st Dep't
1976) (while fourteenth amendment prohibits state action with respect to certain guaran-
teed freedoms, State of New York has emphatically guaranteed same freedoms as right of
its citizens). See generally Galie, The Other Supreme Court: Judicial Activism Among State Su-
preme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 795 (1982) (discussion of justifications used by states
to utilize standards different from federal government).
s See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 351-52 (1946) (protection of freedom of
utterances is required by Constitution); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941)
(first amendment prohibitions intended to preserve liberty); see also LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION, 146 (1988) (Bill of Rights was bill of restraints on United
States).
87 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, section 8. See People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501
N.E.2d 556, 559-60, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) (purpose of New York's Constitution is
to expressly affirm rather than merely restrain free expression); Note, Developments in the
Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1399 (1982)
(New York Constitution phrased free speech provision in terms of affirmative right).
See, e.g., People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 558, 503 N.E.2d 492,
495, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844,- 847 (1986) (New York found closing of bookstores under a nui-
sance ordinance unconstitutional, after Supreme Court had upheld ordinance as valid); Bel-
lanca v. New York Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 235, 429 N.E.2d 765, 768, 445 N.Y.S.2d
87, 90 (1981) ("our State Constitution contains no provision modifying the State guarantee
of freedom of expression corresponding to what the Supreme Court has held"), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982).
" See People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406-07, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d
618, 624 (1985) (state held federal test not binding as matter of state constitutional law
notwithstanding identical language); People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 241, 406 N.E.2d
471, 477, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 662 (1985) (court declined to use less stringent federal test).
Although the language of N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12 and U.S. CONST. amend. IV is identical,
New York courts have consistently interpreted its constitutional provision to grant height-
ened protection. See Note, Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution: Revised Inter-
pretation in the Wake of New Federal Standards?, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 770, 779 (1986) (dis-
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York courts have relied on the state's unique characteristics to
bolster positions independent of and more demanding than fed-
eral constitutional requirements.90
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF Caviglia
Although Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Renton is lim-
ited to the purveyance of "sexually explicit material" '91 and thus
seems applicable only to the "lower value" forms of speech identi-
fied in Young,92 one must consider the likelihood that Renton can
also be applied to political or "high value" speech.9" This troub-
cusses heightened protection regardless of identical language).
10 See Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145 ("New York
has a long history and tradition of fostering freedom of expression, often tolerating and
supporting works which in other States would be found offensive to the community."). See
also Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 409
(1987) (combination of high detail and accessibility to amendment process gives state con-
stitution distinct character); Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an
Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431, 465 (1987) ("A particular state's own
history or unique traditions may provide the basis for an interpretation differing from that
which the nation's High Court has adopted in relation to a cognate federal constitutional
provision.").
91 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986). Justice Rehnquist wrote,
"[I]n American Mini Theatres, a majority of this Court decided that, at least with respect to
businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances designed to combat
the secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable
to content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations." Id.
" See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) ("[S]ociety's interest in
protecting this [low value] type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate .. ."). See also Renton, 475 U.S. at 49
(definition of low-value speech in Young echoed in Renton).
One commentator found support for limiting Renton to nonobscene, sexually explicit
speech, in a case handed down by the Court the same day. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3 at
799 n. 17. Professor Tribe points out that in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n,
475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986), a case not involving low value-speech, the Court appeared to affirm
the traditional test for time, place, and manner regulations. L. TRIBE, supra, § 12-3 at 799
n.17.
"' See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987). "The First
Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on par-
ticular view points, but also to prohibitions of public discussion of an entire topic." Id.
(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
The concern over political speech even predated Renton. See FCC v. League of Woman
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984) ("[Eixpression on public issues has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values." (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 467 (1980))); Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 538 ("To allow a government a
choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow the government control
over the search for political truth."). See also, Note, Court Approved Censorship, supra note
74, at 289 (noted that if secondary effects test is "[clarried to its logical end, this reasoning
could be employed to bar controversial public political debate ...").
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 149, 1989
ling possibility came close to realization in the recently decided
case of Boos v. Barry."' In Boos the Supreme Court endorsed an
expansive reading of Renton which would apply the secondary ef-
fects test beyond the context of non-obscene, sexually explicit
speech.9 This is quite an unsettling development because "sec-
ondary effects offer countless excuses for content-based suppres-
sion of political speech." 96 Thus, in light of the Boos case and the
Outside the context of "low-value" speech at issue in Young, Renton, and Caviglia, nor-
mally protected "high-value" speech is carefully guarded. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980) (statute cannot discriminate on subject matter or speaker's view-
points); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (statute which exempted
peaceful labor picketing from general prohibition subject to strict scrutiny); Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (words on jacket deemed political speech, given highest
protection).
485 U.S. 312, (1988). In Boos, the Court struck down a provision of the District of
Columbia code prohibiting display, within 500 feet of a foreign embassy, any sign tending
to bring that foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute." Id. at 313-14.
The communication at issue in Boos was "classically political speech." Id. at 318. Political
speech reflects a well established principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
"6 Boos, 485 U.S. at 320-2 1. A three Justice plurality (Justices Stevens and Scalia joined
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion), strongly intimated that the Renton secondary effects
test as applied to this highly-protected political speech. Id. This reaches far beyond the
context of low-value, nonobscene, sexually explicit speech. See supra notes 92-93 and ac-
companying text. The plurality went so far as to present what types of secondary effects
the city would have needed to rely upon in order to trigger the Renton analysis: "Respon-
dents and the United States do not point to the 'secondary effects' of picket signs in front
of embassies. They do not point to congregation, to interference with ingress or egress, to
visual clutter, or to the need to protect the security of embassies." Boos, 485 U.S. at 321
(emphasis added).
Justices Brennan and Marshall objected to "Justice O'Connor's assumption that the Ren-
ton analysis applies not only outside the context of businesses purveying sexually explicit
materials but even to political speech." Id. at 335 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concurring in
part). Justice Brennan also reiterated his exception to the view "that an otherwise content-
based restriction on speech can be recast as 'content-neutral' if the restriction 'aims' at
'secondary effects' of the speech." Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, alternatively, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, would
have upheld the regulation, and relied on the reasons adopted by the majority of the Court
of Appeals below. Id. at 338-39. He did not indicate any disagreement with Justice's
O'Connor's characterization of the holding and the scope of Renton. Id. at 339.
" Boos, 485 U.S. 335 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concurring in part). The concurrence as-
serts that just about any "plausible argument" could be made is support of the "damaging"
secondary effects. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall feel that reliance on secondary effects
"creates a possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can concoct 'sec-
ondary' rationalizations for regulating the content of political speech." Id. at 1171. Con-
gestion, visual clutter, threat to security, or deterioration of property values were offered
by the plurality as possible secondary effects which the Court could have relied upon to
sustain the content-based ordinance. Id. See generally Note, The Boland Amendments and For-
eign Affairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1564-65 (1988) (Boos speech was political);
Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1904
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utilization of the secondary effects test in Caviglia, there exists the
possibility that the New York Court of Appeals will follow the
Boos Court and adopt an expansive view of Renton." Such a devel-
opment will further erode individual rights guaranteed by the
New York Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The first amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, "presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a mul-
titude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion. To mapy, this is, and always will be folly; but we have staked
upon it our all." '98 It is not contended that the speech at issue in
Caviglia is of paramount importance and worthy of the most strin-
gent first amendment protections. However, Judge Hand's reason-
ing should serve as a reminder that free speech is a fundamental
precept of American democracy. Repression by a governing ma-
jority should not overcome that which is guaranteed to the indi-
vidual as a matter of right.
One cannot ignore the fact that the multitude of people look
upon adult businesses with repugnance and loathesome distaste.
Yet distaste for speech has never been a justification to suppress
(1989) (discussion of Boos in light of Renton).
" See Boos, 485 U.S. at 338. Referring to the plurality's expansive interpretation of Ren-
ton, Justice Brennan stated:
It is nonetheless ominous dictum, for it could set the Court on a road that will lead
to the evisceration of First Amendment freedoms. I can only hope that, when the
Court is actually presented with a case involving a content-based regulation of politi-
cal speech that allegedly aims at so-called secondary effects of that speech, the Court
will recognize and avoid the pitfalls of the Renton approach.
Id.
It is also significant to note that while the dissent in Caviglia make reference to the Boos
decision, the majority does not. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 573, 540 N.E.2d at 232, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 155-56. The New York Court of Appeals is not immune, and merely ignoring
the Supreme Court's developing content-distinction analysis could prove treacherous. Pro-
fessor Stone has opined:
If taken seriously, and extended to other contexts, the Court's transmogrification in
Renton of an expressly content-based restriction into one that is content-neutral
threatens to undermine the very foundation of the content-based/content-neutral
distinction. This would in turn erode the coherence and predictability of the first
amendment doctrine. One can only hope that this aspect of Renton is soon forgotten.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 32, at 116-117.
See generally Note, supra note 93 (more recent discussion of Renton in view of new case law).
" United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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protected speech, 9 and should not be permitted to do so now.
Although the United States Supreme Court has endorsed the sec-
ondar effects test, the New York Court of Appeals should look
instead to the traditionally expansive view of the first amendment
guarantees under its own state constitution.
William C. Kelly & Jeannette A. Remetich
"' Boos, 485 U.S. at 334.
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